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Abstract
It is becoming widely appreciated that higher stimulus sensitivity trivially increases estimates of metacognitive sensitivity.
Therefore, meaningful comparisons of metacognitive ability across conditions and observers necessitates equating stimu-
lus sensitivity. To achieve this, one common approach is to use a continuous staircase that runs throughout the duration of
the experiment under the assumption that this procedure has no influence on the estimated metacognitive ability. Here we
critically examine this assumption. Using previously published data, we find that, compared to using a single level of
stimulus contrast, staircase techniques lead to inflated estimates of metacognitive ability across a wide variety of measures
including area under the type 2 ROC curve, the confidence-accuracy correlation phi, meta-d0, meta-d0/d0, and meta-d0–d0.
Furthermore, this metacognitive inflation correlates with the degree of stimulus variability experienced by each subject.
These results suggest that studies using a staircase approach are likely to report inflated estimates of metacognitive ability.
Furthermore, we argue that similar inflation likely occurs in the presence of variability in task difficulty caused by other fac-
tors such as fluctuations in alertness or gradual improvement on the task. We offer practical solutions to these issues, both
in the design and analysis of metacognition experiments.
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Introduction
Humans have the ability to reflect on their own decisions and
judge how likely they are to be correct (Metcalfe and Shimamura
1994; Shimamura 2000; Fleming et al. 2012a). The ability to evalu-
ate one’s accuracy using confidence ratings is a common mea-
sure of metacognitive ability. Individual differences in
metacognitive ability have been found to correlate with brain
structure and function (Fleming et al. 2010; Yokoyama et al. 2010;
Baird et al. 2013; McCurdy et al. 2013; Rahnev et al. 2015; Allen et al.
2017), as well as behavioral measures such as psychiatric symp-
tom dimensions (Rouault et al. 2018). Because estimation of meta-
cognitive ability is central to understanding the psychological
and neural mechanisms supporting metacognition and
introspection, and may serve as a future clinical tool, it is of criti-
cal importance that these measures be as precise as possible.
A well-recognized hurdle in estimating subject-specific
metacognitive ability is the influence of primary task perfor-
mance on estimated metacognitive performance (Galvin et al.
2003; Maniscalco and Lau 2012). Specifically, higher task perfor-
mance (reflected in higher “type 1” sensitivity, d0) has been
shown to naturally lead to higher estimates of metacognitive
sensitivity (Maniscalco and Lau 2014). It has been proposed that
this effect can be minimized or removed by instead using meas-
ures of “metacognitive efficiency” (Fleming and Lau 2014) such
as meta-d0/d0. We return to this issue in the Discussion section.
Nevertheless, unless measures of metacognitive efficiency are
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employed, comparisons of metacognitive abilities of different
subjects—or the metacognitive ability of the same subject in dif-
ferent experimental conditions—necessitate matching task per-
formance across subjects or conditions.
In studies of metacognition of simple perceptual judgments,
it is becoming common for researchers to employ a staircase
procedure that adjusts the stimulus intensity throughout the
experiment to achieve uniformity in stimulus sensitivity be-
tween subjects (Fleming et al. 2010, 2012b; Allen et al. 2017). This
procedure is typically successful in ensuring that performance
is close to a predetermined level (typically around 71% correct).
Staircases are less common in other task domains such as
memory, partly because they are more complex to design and
implement (although see Carpenter et al. 2019), but we antici-
pate the effects of staircases on measurement of metacognition
that we outline below will also manifest in other domains be-
yond perception.
The continuous staircase introduces stimulus variability
with the tacit assumption that this variability has no direct in-
fluence on the estimated metacognitive ability. However, mix-
ing low and high contrast stimuli may make it easier for
confidence ratings to distinguish between correct and incorrect
trials. To illustrate this point, consider an extreme case in which
a subject is presented with an even mixture of zero-contrast tri-
als (producing 50% correct) and full-contrast trials (producing
100% correct). The subject’s performance over all trials would
thus be 75% correct, equivalent to that produced by
intermediate-contrast trials. At the same time, the subject
would trivially classify all zero-contrast trials with low confi-
dence and full-contrast trials with high confidence. In contrast,
categorizing intermediate-contrast trials with low and high con-
fidence would necessarily be more difficult since all trials are
similar to each other. Therefore, confidence ratings for
intermediate-contrast trials would be less informative com-
pared to the extreme mixture of zero- and full-contrast trials. In
other words, an even mixture of zero- and full-contrast trials
would produce the same type 1 performance as exclusively pre-
senting intermediate-contrast trials but will likely be character-
ized by much better type 2 performance (confidence ratings will
be more informative of accuracy). Thus, a mixture of difficult
and easy trials would be expected to lead to an inflated estimate
of metacognitive ability compared to the presentation of a sin-
gle, intermediate difficulty level.
The notion that mixing different contrasts leads to inflated
estimates of metacognitive ability has received recent empirical
support. In Experiment 3 of their paper, Bang et al. (2019) found
that mixing increasingly dissimilar contrast levels led to in-
creasing estimates of metacognitive ability. However, Bang et al.
only tested the influence of such mixtures on the measures
meta-d0/d0 and meta-d0–d0, so it is possible that the effects were
partly driven by the specific assumptions inherent in these
measures. More importantly, the mixtures in Bang et al. (2019)
contained equal number of trials coming from each contrast,
but staircase procedures result in a bell-shaped curve of con-
trast prevalence such that intermediate contrasts are presented
many times and very low and high contrasts are presented
fewer times. It thus remains unclear whether staircase proce-
dures lead to a similar inflation of metacognitive ability (as
compared to using a single contrast), especially across a more
divergent set of measures of metacognitive ability.
Here, we tested directly whether a staircase procedure
results in inflated estimates of metacognitive ability as com-
pared to estimates of metacognitive ability based on a single
difficulty level. To do so, we re-analyzed data from Fleming
et al. (2010) in which healthy subjects gave confidence ratings
following 2-interval forced choice contrast discrimination judg-
ments. A two-down one-up staircase ran throughout the task to
maintain performance at 71% correct. In the original paper,
Fleming et al. reported variation in the area under the type 2
ROC (type 2 AUC) as a key measure of metacognitive ability,
finding that it was uncorrelated with type 1 performance and
was predicted by gray matter volume and white matter integrity
in the anterior prefrontal cortex.
We computed five different common measures of metacog-
nitive ability across three levels of stimulus variability: a single
contrast level, three contiguous contrast levels, and the full
range of contrast levels used in the original experiment. To an-
ticipate, we found that increased stimulus variability led to in-
creased estimates of metacognitive ability across all five
measures. Furthermore, the level of increase between the single
contrast and the full range of contrasts correlated positively
with the specific amount of stimulus variability experienced by
each subject. These results suggest that a mixture of difficulty
levels inherent in staircase procedures indeed leads to inflated
estimates of metacognitive ability.
Methods
Subjects
The Fleming et al. (2010) dataset consists of 32 subjects (17
females; range 19–37 years). Just as in the original publication,
we excluded one subject from further analysis due to aberrant
psychophysical task performance [their d0 was more than three
standard deviations (SDs) higher than the group mean]. The
study was approved by the local Research Ethics Committee
and all subjects gave written informed consent.
Task and procedures
All experimental details are available in Fleming et al. (2010).
Briefly, subjects completed a 2-interval forced choice in which
they indicated whether the first or second temporal interval
contained a pop-out Gabor patch of higher contrast. Each inter-
val contained six Gabor patches of 20% contrast, except for a
single Gabor patch of higher contrast (between 23% and 80%)
that could occur in either the first or the second interval. The
contrast of the pop-out Gabor patch was continually adjusted
via two-down one-up staircase procedure with a fixed step size
of 3% contrast to maintain 71% performance. The procedure
decreased the stimulus contrast after every incorrect trial and
increased it after two consecutive correct trials. On every trial,
subjects provided a confidence rating on a six-point scale. No
feedback was given until the end of the experiment. Subjects
completed a practice session, followed by the main experiment
consisting of six blocks of 100 trials each. There was a small
practice effect such that both the mean contrast and variability
of contrast values decreased after block 1. Therefore, Fleming
et al. (2010) only analyzed the data from blocks 2–6. Here we fol-
low the same procedure.
Measures of metacognitive ability
To ensure that our results are not due to the idiosyncrasies of a
specific measure, we computed metacognitive ability via five
different measures that are common in the literature. For all
five measures, the raw confidence levels from the six-point
scale were used. First, we computed type 2 AUC: the area under
the type 2 ROC curve, which is the same measure used in
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Fleming et al. (2010). Second, we computed phi (Kornell et al.
2007): the Pearson correlation between confidence and accu-
racy. Finally, we computed three measures derived from the
work of Maniscalco and Lau (2012): meta-d0, meta-d0/d0, and
meta-d0–d0. These five measures each invoke different sets of
assumptions (Fleming and Lau 2014) and therefore we used all
of them in our study (the three measures stemming from the
work of Maniscalco and Lau are based on the same model but
the different ways of normalizing meta-d0 come with different
inherent assumptions about the best way to quantify the under-
lying metacognitive ability).
To compute type 2 AUC, we used the same steps as de-
scribed in Fleming et al. (2010). Briefly, for each confidence crite-
rion, we computed type 2 hit and false alarm rates, where type 2
hits are defined as high confidence correct responses, type 2
misses as low confidence correct responses, type 2 false alarms
as high confidence incorrect responses, and type 2 correct rejec-
tions as low confidence incorrect responses. We constructed a
type 2 ROC curve based on the type 2 hit and false alarm rates
estimated at each level of confidence, and the area under that
curve produced the type 2 AUC measure.
To compute phi, we created an accuracy variable where we
coded each correct response as “1” and each incorrect response
as “0.” The measure phi was then computed as the across-trial
Pearson correlation of this accuracy variable and the confidence
ratings produced on different trials.
Finally, to compute meta-d0, meta-d0/d0, and meta-d0–d0, we
used the code provided by Maniscalco and Lau (2012). The mea-
sure meta-d0 is computed by determining the d0 value that
would produce the observed type 2 hit and false alarm rates un-
der a signal detection theory model which assumes perfect
metacognition. The additional measures meta-d0/d0 and meta-
d0–d0 were obtained by normalizing meta-d0 by d0 via division or
subtraction, respectively.
Analyses
To compare how estimates of metacognitive ability change sys-
tematically across different levels of stimulus variability, we
created three subsets of the data with increasing amount of
stimulus variability.
First, for each subject, we found the contrast level that the
subject experienced most frequently. The most common con-
trast was presented on average 122.1 times per subject
(SD¼ 19.7). We then computed all five measures of metacogni-
tion based only on the subset of trials in which subjects experi-
enced this contrast value. We call this the “1-contrast”
condition to indicate that it consisted of trials of a single
contrast.
Second, for each subject, we determined a set of three con-
secutive contrast values such that the most common contrast
(used in the first condition) was always the middle contrast. In
other words, in this condition we analyzed the most common
contrast together with its two “flanking” contrasts, which were
the closest contrasts to the most common one and differed
from it by a single step size of the staircasing procedure. This
condition included on average 320.3 trials per subject (SD¼ 45).
Each measure of metacognitive ability was then computed for
all trials within this subset. We call this the “3-contrast” condi-
tion to indicate that it consisted of trials of three contiguous
contrast values.
Third, we computed all metacognition measures based on
all 500 trials experienced by each subject irrespective of con-
trast. Note that this is how the data were analyzed in Fleming
et al. (2010). We call this the “all-contrast” condition to indicate
that it consisted of all contrast values used in the experiment.
We compared the estimated measures in each of these three
conditions using one-way repeated measures ANOVAs (with
factor condition) and followed up with the paired t-tests. We
further investigated whether the differences in estimated meta-
cognitive ability between conditions could be due to the differ-
ent number of trials that went into each of the three conditions.
For each subject, we considered the pool of trials in the 3- and
all-contrast conditions and drew a random sample of these tri-
als such that the size of the sample was equal to the number of
trials in the 1-contrast condition for that subject. We repeated
the procedure 100 times and re-did the analyses above using
the averaged metacognitive scores across all 100 samples in the
3- and all-contrast conditions.
Finally, we correlated the amount of stimulus variability ex-
perienced by each subject with the amount of metacognitive in-
flation caused by the use of the staircase. Stimulus variability
was defined as the SD of the contrast values experienced by
each subject normalized by the average contrast value.
Metacognitive inflation was defined separately for each mea-
sure of metacognitive ability as the difference in the estimated
value in the all-contrast and the 1-contrast conditions:
Minflation ¼ Mallcontrast  M1contrast
where M refers to a particular measure of metacognitive ability.
Finally, we performed a Pearson correlation to compute the
level of association between stimulus variability and metacog-
nitive inflation across subjects.
Data and code
Processed data, together with MATLAB codes that generate all
figures and statistical results, are freely available at: https://
github.com/DobyRahnev/staircase_meta_inflation.
Results
We investigated whether increased stimulus variability caused
by continuously adjusting stimulus contrast affects various
measures of metacognitive ability. To do so, we defined three
conditions with increasing stimulus variability: (i) “1-contrast”
condition, in which we analyzed only the contrast experienced
most frequently by each subject, (ii) “3-contrast” condition, in
which we analyzed the most frequent contrast together with its
two flanking contrasts, and (iii) “all-contrast” condition, in
which all stimulus contrasts were analyzed (a graphical depic-
tion is provided in Fig. 1).
We first compared how stimulus sensitivity, d0, was affected
by the three stimulus variability conditions. A one-way repeated
measures ANOVA showed no significant differences between
conditions [F(2, 60)¼ 0.71, P¼ 0.49; Fig. 2, individual data and ob-
servation densities in the form of raincloud plots (Allen et al.
2018) are shown in Supplementary Fig. S1]. Furthermore, the
paired t-tests did not show significant difference between any
pair of conditions [1-contrast vs. 3-contrast: t(30)¼ 1.07, P¼ 0.29;
1-contrast vs. all-contrast: t(30) ¼ 0.81, P¼ 0.42; 3-contrast vs.
all-contrast: t(30)¼0.05, P¼ 0.96]. In addition, the average d0
across the three conditions did not correlate across subjects
with either the experienced stimulus variability (r¼ 0.07, P¼ 0.7)
or the pairwise differences between the metacognitive scores
for the all- and 1-contrast conditions (type 2 AUC: r¼0.2,
P¼ 0.28; phi: r¼0.18, P¼ 0.32; meta-d0: r¼0.19, P¼ 0.34;
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meta-d0/d0: r¼0.06, P¼ 0.76; meta-d0–d0: r¼ 0.01, P¼ 0.95). These
results suggest that the three conditions were well matched on
primary task performance and any differences in metacognitive
ability cannot be attributed to differences in task performance.
We next turned to the critical question regarding the effect
of stimulus variability on the estimated metacognitive ability.
To avoid biasing our results by the idiosyncrasies of any individ-
ual measure, we examined the effect of stimulus variability on
five different measures of metacognitive ability: type 2 AUC,
phi, meta-d0, meta-d0/d0, and meta-d0–d0 (see Methods section).
For each measure, we conducted a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA to check for differences between the different condi-
tions. We found that in all cases the estimated metacognitive
ability was significantly influenced by the level of stimulus vari-
ability [type 2 AUC: F(2, 60)¼ 8.66, P¼ 0.0005; phi: F(2, 60)¼ 8.38,
P¼ 0.0006; meta-d0: F(2, 60)¼ 9.68, P¼ 0.0002; meta-d0/d0: F(2,
60)¼ 8.45, P¼ 0.0006; meta-d0–d0: F(2, 60)¼ 9.61, P¼ 0.0002; Fig. 3,
individual data and observation densities in the form of rain-
cloud plots (Allen et al. 2018) are shown in Supplementary Fig.
S2].
To understand the nature of the observed differences in
metacognition, we compared different pairs of conditions using
the paired t-tests. First, we compared the 1-contrast and all-
contrast conditions. We found that the all-contrast condition
led to significantly higher estimates of metacognitive ability for
all five measures [type 2 AUC: difference¼ 0.034; t(30)¼ 3.18,
P¼ 0.003, Cohen’s d¼ 0.57; phi: difference¼ 0.047; t(30)¼ 3.18,
P¼ 0.003, Cohen’s d¼ 0.57; meta-d0: difference¼ 0.238;
t(30)¼ 3.38, P¼ 0.002, Cohen’s d¼ 0.61; meta-d0/d0: differ-
ence¼ 0.178; t(30)¼ 3.3, P¼ 0.003, Cohen’s d¼ 0.59; meta-d0–d0:
difference¼ 0.253; t(30)¼ 3.51, P¼ 0.001, Cohen’s d¼ 0.63].
Comparing the 3-contrast and all-contrast conditions produced
smaller differences in estimated metacognitive ability (see
Fig. 3) but all these differences were nevertheless highly signifi-
cant (P< 0.0009 and Cohen’s d> 0.66 for all measures; detailed
statistical results are reported in Supplementary Results). The
fact that the differences between the 3-contrast and all-contrast
conditions produced consistently lower P-values than the dif-
ference between the 1-contrast and all-contrast condition is
likely due to the smaller number of trials in the 1-contrast con-
dition (which led to higher variability in estimated metacogni-
tive ability, see Supplementary Fig. S2). Finally, the comparison
between the 1-contrast and 3-contrast conditions was signifi-
cant for four of the five measures [type 2 AUC: t(30)¼ 2.07,
P¼ 0.047; meta-d0: t(30)¼ 2.4, P¼ 0.022; meta-d0/d0: t(30)¼ 2.12,
P¼ 0.042; meta-d0–d0: t(30)¼ 2.3, P¼ 0.028] and non-significant
for one measure [phi: t(30)¼ 1.95, P¼ 0.061].
One difference between the three conditions is that they
were not matched for number of trials: the 1-contrast condition
included on average 122 trials per subject, the 3-contrast condi-
tion included on average 320 trials per subject, and the all-
contrast condition always included all 500 trials per subject.
Previous research has suggested that the number of trials can
bias measures of metacognitive ability (Fleming 2017).
Therefore, in a control analysis, we created 100 random samples
from the 3- and all-contrast conditions such that each sample
contained the same number of trials as the 1-contrast condition
for that subject. We then averaged the metacognitive scores
obtained from these 100 samples and repeated the above analy-
ses (Supplementary Fig. S3). We obtained very similar results:
all five ANOVAs remained significant (all P< 0.0015; detailed
statistical results are reported in Supplementary Results) and so
did all five pairwise comparisons between the 1- and all-
contrast conditions (all P< 0.0065; detailed statistical results are
reported in Supplementary Results). Thus, the increase in the
estimated metacognitive ability with increasing contrast ranges
cannot be explained by the difference in number of trials be-
tween the conditions.
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Figure 1. Defining three conditions with increasing level of stimulus
variability. The upper panel shows the contrast values experienced
by an example subject during one block of 100 trials. The lower panel
shows the total number of trials in which each contrast level was
presented. The three colored rectangles depict how each condition
was defined. The “1-contrast” condition (blue rectangle) consisted of
the most frequent contrast only. The “3-contrast” condition (red
rectangle) consisted of the most frequent contrast, as well as its two
flanking contrasts. Finally, the “all-contrast” condition (yellow rect-
angle) consisted of all contrasts experienced by the subject. Note
that these three conditions were defined for each subject separately
after aggregating the data from all five blocks experienced by that
subject.
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Figure 2. Stimulus sensitivity d0 for each stimulus variability condi-
tion. The 1-contrast, 3-contrasts, and all-contrast conditions were
well matched on stimulus sensitivity (d0) with all pairwise compari-
sons failing to reach significance (all P> 0.2). Error bars depict stan-
dard error of the mean. n.s., not significant.
4 | Rahnev and Fleming
These results establish that conditions that feature increas-
ingly divergent contrast levels result in increasingly higher esti-
mates of metacognitive ability. We quantified this
metacognitive inflation as the difference in estimated metacog-
nitive ability between the all-contrast and 1-contrast conditions
(i.e. Minflation ¼ Mallcontrast  M1contrast, where M refers to a par-
ticular measure of metacognitive ability).
To identify the causes of metacognitive inflation, we next in-
vestigated whether this inflation depends on the particular level
of stimulus variability experienced by a given subject. For each
subject, we determined the level of experienced stimulus vari-
ability (computed as the ratio of the SD across all experienced
contrasts and the average contrast). In addition, for each of the
five measures, we computed metacognitive inflation as the dif-
ference in metacognitive ability between the all-contrast and 1-
contrast conditions. Finally, we correlated these two quantities
separately for each of the five measures of metacognition. We
found that, for each measure, metacognitive inflation was sig-
nificantly correlated with stimulus variability (type 2 AUC:
r¼ 0.43, P¼ 0.014; phi: r¼ 0.44, P¼ 0.013; meta-d0: r¼ 0.49,
P¼ 0.005; meta-d0/d0: r¼ 0.42, P¼ 0.018; meta-d0–d0: r¼ 0.5,
P¼ 0.004; Fig. 4; one subject exhibited slightly higher stimulus
variability than the rest of the group; all correlations remain sig-
nificant even after excluding this subject). In other words, the
inflation of metacognitive ability was larger for subjects who ex-
perienced greater stimulus variability, further underscoring a
link between these quantities.
Since stimulus variability is related to metacognitive infla-
tion, it is important to consider what causes the difference in
stimulus variability between subjects. Part of the answer is
clearly random chance—the accuracy of individual responses is
stochastic and therefore by chance alone some subjects will ex-
perience longer streaks of correct and incorrect responses than
others, leading to higher stimulus variability. Nevertheless, it is
possible that stimulus variability is at least partly driven by
meaningful individual differences. One such potential differ-
ence is variability in metacognitive ability itself. Specifically,
subjects with lower intrinsic metacognitive ability could be
inherently more variable in their responses. If this is true, then
metacognitive ability on the 1-contrast condition may correlate
negatively with stimulus variability. Note that the 1-contrast
condition consisted of a single contrast and therefore the meta-
cognitive ability within that condition is statistically indepen-
dent of subject-specific stimulus variability. Despite this, we
observed a robust negative correlation such that higher meta-
cognitive ability in the 1-contrast condition was associated with
lower experienced stimulus variability (type 2 AUC: r¼0.64,
P¼ 0.0001; phi: r¼0.63, P¼ 0.0001; meta-d0: r¼0.65,
P¼ 0.00008; meta-d0/d0: r¼0.58, P¼ 0.0005; meta-d0–d0: r¼0.61,
P¼ 0.0003; Fig. 5; all correlations remain significant even after
again excluding the subject with highest stimulus variability).
These results are consistent with the notion that the stimulus
variability experienced during the staircase procedure is partly
a product of intrinsic metacognitive ability (we consider other
possible directions of causation in the Discussion section).
Discussion
In an effort to equalize performance between different subjects
or conditions, researchers are now frequently employing a stair-
case that continuously adjusts stimulus contrast over the dura-
tion of the experiment. Although this method is effective in
ensuring that all subjects perform close to a predetermined
level, it has remained unclear whether such continuous stair-
cases affect the estimated metacognitive ability. We re-
analyzed data from Fleming et al. (2010) in order to understand
the influence of the staircase method on estimates of metacog-
nitive ability. We obtained three primary findings, summarized
graphically in Fig. 6. First, aggregating over the different con-
trast levels used in the staircase leads to higher estimates of
metacognitive ability compared to a condition with a single con-
trast (Fig. 6A). We refer to such higher estimates as
“metacognitive inflation.” Second, the degree of this metacogni-
tive inflation across subjects correlates positively with the
amount of stimulus variability experienced by each subject
(Fig. 6B). Third, the stimulus variability experienced by each
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subject correlates negatively with subjects’ metacognitive abil-
ity estimated from stimuli with a single contrast (Fig. 6B). All
three of these findings were robust, holding true for each of five
different measures of metacognition.
The reason for metacognitive inflation
Our most important finding was that aggregating across stimuli
of different difficulty levels leads to an inflation of the
estimated metacognitive ability (Figs 3 and 6A). In other words,
when easier and harder trials are analyzed together, subjects’
metacognitive abilities appear to be better than they actually
are. A similar effect was previously reported for the case of
meta-d0/d0 and meta-d0–d0 in the context of mixing equal num-
bers of up to three different contrasts (Bang et al. 2019). Here, we
show that this result holds across all popular measures of meta-
cognitive ability and occurs even when the contrast mixture is
bell-shaped, and itself a product of a staircase (Fig. 1).
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Figure 5. Stimulus variability is associated with metacognitive ability in the 1-contrast condition. For each measure of metacognitive ability, we
correlated the stimulus variability experienced by each subject with the estimated metacognitive ability in the 1-contrast condition. The signif-
icant negative correlations may indicate that low intrinsic metacognitive ability contributes to high contrast variability in the staircase
procedure.
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What is the reason for metacognitive inflation? As explained in
the Introduction section, mixing low and high contrast stimuli
may make it easier for confidence ratings to distinguish between
correct and incorrect trials. When such low and high contrast stim-
uli are analyzed together in the same condition, they result in
higher values of estimated metacognitive ability. Another potential
reason for metacognitive inflation is the presence of metacognitive
noise. Metacognitive noise is noise that affects confidence esti-
mates but not perceptual decisions (Mueller and Weidemann 2008;
Jang et al. 2012; De Martino et al. 2013; Maniscalco and Lau 2016;
Rahnev et al. 2016; van den Berg et al. 2017; Shekhar and Rahnev
2018). Bang et al. (2019) showed that combining several contrast lev-
els in a single analysis amplifies the external stimulus variability
and thus increases the sensory noise measured in the framework
of signal detection theory. Furthermore, they demonstrated that
increasing sensory noise leads to a decrease in both d0 and meta-d0
but that the decrease is larger for d0. Because of these differential
effects on d0 and meta-d0, higher sensory noise leads to increased
metacognitive efficiency meta-d0/d0 and meta-d0–d0. Therefore,
metacognitive noise likely contributed to the increase in metacog-
nitive efficiency scores (meta-d0/d0 and meta-d0–d0) in the current
analyses. However, since metacognitive noise decreases both d0
and meta-d0, it should have had the opposite effect on measures of
metacognitive sensitivity (i.e. meta-d0, type 2 AUC, and phi) (Bang
et al. 2019). Thus, we do not consider metacognitive noise as the
main contributor to the metacognitive inflation observed here.
Metacognitive scores estimated from a single contrast
are most informative about a subject’s intrinsic ability
We refer to the higher estimates of metacognitive ability in con-
ditions that aggregate over multiple contrasts as “metacognitive
inflation” (Fig. 6A). This nomenclature assumes that using a sin-
gle contrast should be considered the baseline against which
other conditions should be compared. What makes the single-
contrast condition the best choice of baseline?
To answer this question, it is important to appreciate that
the estimated metacognitive ability in each condition is a func-
tion of both a subject’s intrinsic ability and the properties of the
stimulus mixture. Specifically, as more dissimilar contrasts are
aggregated together, the estimated metacognitive ability would
begin to reflect the properties of this mixture rather than the
ability of the subject. Consider the extreme case discussed in
the Introduction section where zero-contrast trials (producing
chance performance) and full-contrast trials (producing 100%
correct performance) are mixed. This type of extreme mixture
would elicit the same pattern of response from all subjects
where zero-contrast trials always receive low confidence and
full-contrast trials always receive high confidence. This extreme
condition would thus result in all subjects appearing to have
the exact same (very high) metacognitive ability and would
mask any true differences between subjects. To a smaller de-
gree, less extreme mixtures would have the same effect, and
what is worse, the estimated metacognitive ability could be con-
taminated by the fact that each subject experiences a different
mixture. In contrast, metacognitive performance in a condition
where a single difficulty level is presented should more closely
track the intrinsic abilities of the subject. Therefore, we believe
the single-contrast condition is most informative for revealing
subjects’ intrinsic metacognitive ability. It is in this sense that
we consider this condition a baseline against which other con-
ditions should be compared.
Recommendations for experimental design and analysis
techniques
Our findings show that to accurately estimate a subject’s intrin-
sic metacognitive ability, an experimenter should strive to en-
sure that all trials experienced by the subject have the same
difficulty. Continuous staircase methods violate this recom-
mendation as they purposefully adjust the contrast of the stim-
ulus. Furthermore, staircases with relatively large step sizes are
likely to be especially problematic, whereas staircases with very
small step sizes may only induce negligible stimulus variability.
Other experimental designs feature the presentation of a
few predetermined difficulty levels, which are then analyzed to-
gether. The current findings, together with the results of Bang
et al. (2018), suggest that this practice can be expected to also
lead to inflated estimates of metacognitive ability. Therefore, to
obtain unbiased estimates, each contrast should be analyzed
separately (the estimates obtained from each difficulty level
could then be averaged together in order to obtain a single
metacognitive score per subject).
A related problem arises from the use of stimuli that inher-
ently vary in difficulty. For example, many neuroimaging stud-
ies employ stimulus categories such as faces, scenes, or objects.
It is virtually impossible to ensure that different exemplars of
these categories are matched on difficulty (e.g. it is likely that
some faces are easier to recognize than others regardless of
whether they are embedded in noise, backward-masked, etc.).
Therefore, the use of such categories is likely to also result in
metacognitive inflation compared to designs that use stimuli—
such as Gabor patches, moving dots, etc.—with small or negligi-
ble differences between different exemplars.
Even when researchers include only a single contrast level of
a stimulus category with individual exemplars that do not signifi-
cantly vary in difficulty, it is likely that the difficulty levels experi-
enced by a particular subject would still vary. This could happen
due to learning (Watanabe and Sasaki 2015; Dosher and Lu 2017)
or variations of attention over the course of the experiment
(Maniscalco et al. 2017). Since both of these effects are difficult to
avoid completely, it is likely that every experiment leads to at
least a slight inflation of the estimated metacognitive ability and
that subjects with larger learning effects or more attentional fluc-
tuations show larger metacognitive inflation. In some cases, it
may in fact be beneficial to include a continuous staircase with a
Figure 6. Summary of findings. (A) Metacognitive ability (M) was
higher when estimated from trials with different contrasts (all con-
trasts produced by the staircase procedure) than when estimated
from trials with a single contrast. This result was reported in Fig. 3.
(B) The amount of stimulus variability across subjects correlated
positively with the amount of metacognitive inflation and negatively
with metacognitive ability estimated based on trials with a single
contrast. These results were reported in Figs 4 and 5, respectively.
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very small step size in order to counteract effects of learning or
distraction, especially when testing patient populations where
extensive periods of training may be impractical. Nevertheless,
we suspect that in most cases even such “minimal” staircases
would result in higher, rather than lower, overall variability in
task difficulty. These considerations highlight the need for great
care in experimental design, which should be optimized for the
specific constraints of each experiment.
In general, we recommend designing experiments in ways
that minimize extraneous influences on the estimated metacog-
nitive ability. Most critically, we suggest the gold standard is the
use of a single level of contrast. If several levels of contrast are in-
cluded, then, ideally, metacognitive ability would be computed
for each of them separately and the results averaged. However,
determining in advance the level of contrast that would produce
a desired level of performance is always subject to error (Watson
and Pelli 1983), and may fail to precisely equate subjects on pri-
mary task performance. Nevertheless, in such cases, employing
measures of metacognitive efficiency such as meta-d0/d0 may be
preferable to staircases in allowing a meaningful comparison of
metacognitive ability between subjects with varying levels of pri-
mary task performance (Maniscalco and Lau 2012, 2014). If a con-
tinuous staircase running throughout the experiment is still
judged to be needed, the variability of stimulus contrast can be
estimated for each subject and included as a covariate in subse-
quent analyses as an approximate way of diminishing its influ-
ence. Note, however, that the metacognitive inflation introduced
by combining different contrasts is unlikely to be a perfectly lin-
ear function of stimulus variability, and is therefore unlikely to
be fully accounted for by a simple regression. In addition,
researchers should also attempt to minimize the learning that
takes place over the course of an experiment by providing sub-
jects with an extended training period. Subjects should also be
given sufficient rest throughout the experiment to minimize per-
formance fluctuations due to fatigue and attentional lapses.
Finally, we make all of these recommendations in the con-
text of estimating subjects’ metacognitive abilities, but the
same recommendations generalize to other task domains and
dependent variables. That is, for most (perhaps all) psychophys-
ical quantities of interest, extreme mixtures of difficulty levels
would necessarily elicit a pattern of responses that reflect stim-
ulus properties rather than an individual’s ability or bias. Thus,
the use of a single difficulty level may provide benefits in preci-
sion across multiple dependent measures.
Implications for previous findings using the staircase
method
A number of studies have used the continuous staircase
method to correlate metacognitive ability with various quanti-
ties of interest, such as brain structure and function (e.g.
Fleming et al. 2010, 2012b; Allen et al. 2017). How should we in-
terpret these findings in light of the current results?
Following the logic outlined in Fig. 6A, suppose that previous
studies set out to measure the correlation between a certain
quantity (e.g. brain structure, S) and metacognitive ability (M).
However, instead they measure the correlation between S and
Mþ I, where I is the metacognitive inflation that resulted from
the staircase procedure. The critical question is whether
corr S;Mð Þ and corr S;M þ Ið Þ are significantly different from each
other. This question is impossible to answer in the abstract as it
depends on the specifics of how much inflation has been in-
duced, and we do not have an estimate of I that is independent of
M (since I is operationalized as I ¼ Mallcontrast  M1contrast).
However, it is likely that I depends on stimulus variability, Var,
which we can measure. In fact, in the current dataset, we show
that Var correlates positively with I (Fig. 6B, left). In addition, Var
correlates negatively with M (Fig. 6B, right), which means that
adding M and I together acts to add noise to M. Therefore, the
most likely influence of analyzing corr S;M þ Ið Þ is to weaken cor-
relations that would have been obtained by analyzing corr S;Mð Þ,
suggesting that the findings of prior studies are likely to only be-
come stronger with the use of a constant-stimulus design.
On a practical level, as described above, one simple method
for controlling for possible inflation effects is to enter staircase
variability as a covariate in analyses linking M to S. Fleming
et al. (2010) report this analysis in the supplement of their paper,
showing that individual differences in brain structure (prefron-
tal gray matter volume and white matter integrity) remained
significantly correlated with type 2 AUC after controlling for the
mean and variability (SD) in the staircase, and staircase variabil-
ity was not itself a predictor of brain structure in whole-brain
analyses. The current study provides a principled rationale for
the routine application of such control analyses in future stud-
ies that employ a staircase procedure, and suggests that cleaner
results may be obtained with constant-stimulus designs.
How should we interpret the negative correlation
between metacognitive ability and stimulus variability?
We found that the stimulus variability experienced by each sub-
ject was negatively correlated with metacognitive ability, even
when that ability was estimated from stimuli presented with a
single level of contrast (Figs 5 and 6B). These results are consis-
tent with the possibility that lower metacognitive ability causes
more variable performance on the primary task. However, it is
also possible that the direction of causality runs in the opposite
direction, with higher stimulus variability decreasing metacog-
nitive performance even in the single-contrast condition. The
mechanism for this effect could be based on the fact that within
the context of the current experiment, the single-contrast con-
dition is embedded within trials of variable contrast, which
could have influenced subjects’ responses in that condition.
Indeed, confidence ratings exhibit suboptimal serial depen-
dence (Rahnev et al. 2015; Rahnev and Denison 2018), such that
subjects may use different confidence criteria in the single-
contrast condition after having experienced either low or high
contrast in the previous few trials. Such variability of confi-
dence criteria would in turn result in decreased metacognitive
ability (Shekhar and Rahnev 2018), thus potentially driving the
observed negative correlation.
Further research is needed in order to distinguish between
these two possible causes of the observed negative correlation
between metacognitive ability and stimulus variability.
Specifically, it would be important to test the correlation be-
tween the variability of contrasts in a staircase and the meta-
cognitive ability estimated from a separate block of trials with a
single contrast. If lower metacognitive ability can indeed be
causally linked to more variable task performance, this finding
would suggest that people’s metacognitive ability influences
not only their confidence ratings but also affects the stability of
primary task performance.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that combining multiple difficulty levels
in a single analysis leads to an inflation of estimated metacog-
nitive ability, relative to a constant-stimulus design. While this
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effect can never be avoided completely, researchers should be
aware of it and attempt to minimize it whenever possible. We
suggest that researchers aim for a constant-stimulus design,
and where this is not possible, analyze each difficulty level sep-
arately and avoid aggregating over different difficulty levels. We
believe that such design considerations will provide more ro-
bust measures of metacognition, and in turn drive forward our
understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms
supporting metacognition and introspection.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data is available at NCONSC Journal online.
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